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Abstract
Background: The Ebola virus disease outbreak that started in Western Africa in 2013 was
unprecedented because it spread within densely populated urban environments and
affected many thousands of people. As a result, previous advice and guidelines need to
be critically reviewed, especially with regard to transmission risks in different contexts.
Methods: Scientific and grey literature were searched for articles about any African filo-
virus. Articles were screened for information about transmission (prevalence or odds
ratios especially). Data were extracted from eligible articles and summarized narratively
with partial meta-analysis. Study quality was also evaluated.
Results: A total of 31 reports were selected from 6552 found in the initial search. Eight
papers gave numerical odds for contracting filovirus illness; 23 further articles provided
supporting anecdotal observations about how transmission probably occurred for indi-
viduals. Many forms of contact (conversation, sharing a meal, sharing a bed, direct or
indirect touching) were unlikely to result in disease transmission during incubation or
early illness. Among household contacts who reported directly touching a case, the
attack rate was 32% [95% confidence interval (CI) 26–38%]. Risk of disease transmission
between household members without direct contact was low (1%; 95% CI 0–5%). Caring
for a case in the community, especially until death, and participation in traditional funeral
rites were strongly associated with acquiring disease, probably due to a high degree of
direct physical contact with case or cadaver.
Conclusions: Transmission of filovirus is unlikely except through close contact, espe-
cially during the most severe stages of acute illness. More data are needed about the
context, intimacy and timing of contact required to raise the odds of disease transmis-
sion. Risk factors specific to urban settings may need to be determined.
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Introduction
The 2013–15 epidemic of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in
Western Africa is by far the largest and most widespread
outbreak of this disease to date and case numbers far
exceed the total from all previous EVD emergences. It is
the first outbreak of the Zaire species of Ebola in this
region and the first in urban high population density set-
tings where sustained transmission has occurred. In previ-
ous outbreaks the main focus of attention was on
nosocomial transmission of the disease and on risks associ-
ated with funeral practices. However, the occurrence of
cases in high population density urban environments raised
concern about alternative transmission pathways. The size
of the 2013–15 epidemic was often unmatched by suffi-
cient clinical capacity, which resulted in community-based
care rather than hospitalization of cases.1
Ebola virus is part of the Filoviridae family which also
includes Marburg viruses. Both Ebola and Marburg dis-
eases are generally understood to be zoonotic infections
whose primary hosts are thought to be bats.2–4 Once the
virus crosses from wildlife into humans, subsequent per-
son-to-person spread propagates the outbreak until it is
brought under control. Given the experiences of previous
human filovirus infections, the primary focus of interest
has been in nosocomial spread and spread associated with
funeral practices.5,6 The 2013–15 epidemic differs from
previous outbreaks not only in number of people afflicted
and geographical spread, but also in its setting. Many of
the reported cases have been among people living in high
density and impoverished urban environments. Indeed,
because of the lack of adequate health care facilities, many
people remained in their home community during the en-
tire course of their illness, receiving care from family mem-
bers and neighbours. Hence, the scale of the Western
Africa outbreak resulted in many Ebola treatment centres
being built within or close to these newly-affected urban
communities.
Concerns have been raised that the shift in the 2013–15
epidemic towards infected patients being managed in
urban communities exacerbated disease transmission.7
Consequently there is a greater need to better understand
the mechanisms and risk factors behind intra-community
disease transmission. Only then can appropriate commu-
nity control measures be implemented. Although there are
some previous reviews on Ebola viruses and their epidemi-
ology,8,9 systematic evaluation of evidence on community
human-to-human transmission risks has been limited.
With the development of a highly effective vaccine against
Ebola,10 such rigorous evaluation will be essential to de-
signing optimal strategies for immunization campaigns.
In this systematic review we searched for all published
evidence which identified and/or quantified the risk factors
for community acquisition of filovirus infection. We also
included papers where the authors expressed an opinion as
to how patients acquired infection, even if the evidence to
support this suggestion would not usually meet standards
of acceptable epidemiological evidence.
Methods
Medline and Scopus were searched from inception through
13 August 2015 using the search string filovir*.af. OR
ebola.af. OR ebolavir*.af OR Marburg-virus.af (af means
‘all fields’ including all text words and relevant indexing)
without restrictions for date or language. Twelve sources
of grey literature were searched (see Appendix A1, avail-
able as Supplementary data at IJE online) and screened by
a single investigator. Included papers were also checked for
further studies.
Inclusion criteria
The preferred study for inclusion in this review provided
data that enabled us to assess the odds of filoviral infection
Key Messages
• Human-to-human transmission of filoviruses usually requires direct contact with a symptomatic individual.
• Transmission through indirect contact has been reported, but appears to be uncommon.
• There is a need for more primary epidemiological research in urban communities.
• During outbreaks, provision of appropriate care through designated specialist health facilities reduces transmission
rates.
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transmission between humans according to particular
characteristics, behaviours or contacts (data could be pre-
sented as odds ratios, risk ratios or raw numbers). In add-
ition, we also included papers where the authors expressed
an opinion about how infection was acquired, although
not based on analytical epidemiology (i.e. anecdotal obser-
vations). Eligible filoviral infections were Marburg virus,
Ravn virus, Zaire, Sudan, Taı¨ Forest and Bundibugyo spe-
cies of Ebola. Species of filovirus not present in Africa or
not known to be dangerous to humans were excluded. The
filovirus disease outbreak had to be laboratory confirmed
(using RT-PCR, NAAT or Vero culture tests), as antibodies
or inflammatory factors in body fluids were deemed inad-
equate by themselves to verify the outbreak, because they
are widespread in the regional population including in
many people with no relevant clinical history.9,11–15 Data
were included from mixed patient groups where all or
some had laboratory confirmation of disease cause, all had
a compatible clinical history and survivors were confirmed
as having filovirus antibodies.
Titles and abstracts were screened for inclusion by a
single reviewer and verified by a second researcher.
Conference presentations, protocols, news reports, com-
mentaries and editorials were excluded. Where titles were
not accompanied by abstracts they were only assessed in
full text if they included the word(s) risk or transmission.
Full-text articles were assessed for inclusion independently
in duplicate. Decision differences at all stages were
resolved by discussion. Where several articles reported on
the same primary data, the articles were grouped to ensure
data were not duplicated within the review.
Data were extracted into tables and verified by a se-
cond researcher. Extracted data included bibliographic
details, viral species, date and place of outbreak, risk or
exposure factor(s) identified, assay methods and calcu-
lated odds, hazard or risk ratios or relevant raw data.
Unadjusted and adjusted data (where available) were ex-
tracted and unadjusted odds ratios calculated from raw
data. Where anecdotal opinions of acquisition were pre-
sented, these were also extracted into a separate list. Our
study validity assessment was based on attributes most
likely to undermine the utility of the studies, including
delay in investigating the cause of disease transmission
(for studies identified at low risk of bias this was  3
months from contact), study aim (to quantify human-to-
human transmission or not), whether there was a stand-
ard methodology for data collection and whether the risk
factors assessed were pre-specified. A positive answer
suggested low risk of bias for all of these. Validity was as-
sessed by a single researcher (see Appendix A2, available
as Supplementary data at IJE online). The review is re-
ported in accordance with PRISMA guidelines (Preferred
Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-
Analyses; a PRISMA checklist was included with
submission).16
In order to assess the risk of household transmission, we
identified papers that presented incidence rates in house-
hold contacts (where possible) with and without direct
contact with another case. A random-effects meta-analysis
of proportions was conducted using Stats Direct
TM
and het-
erogeneity checked visually. Separate meta-analyses were
conducted of incidence rates in household contacts with
and without a history of direct contact.
Results
Of 6552 mostly unique articles found in Medline or
Scopus, 114 were immediately excluded for being obvious
conference abstracts, protocols, news reports, commenta-
ries or editorials (Figure 1). A further 2001 items lacked an
abstract and,on brief review, most of these appeared to be
short commentaries, news summaries and possible confer-
ence presentations. Of the 2001 items, only nine were
screened directly because their titles contained keywords
most relevant to our research questions. Thus, 4560 scien-
tific articles were duplicate screened on title and abstract,
of which 52 were not excluded. The grey literature search
(see Supplementary Appendix A1) yielded two inclu-
sions.17,18 One additional article with potential primary
data19 was identified in the discussion text of selected art-
icles; 55 articles were thus chosen for full-text review. Full
text was unavailable for one article20 and, after full-text
review, 23 articles did not meet eligibility criteria. Four art-
icles11,17,19,21 reported at least partly duplicated informa-
tion on two patient groups (a list of outbreaks in the
selected articles to check for duplicated data is in
Supplementary Appendix A3, available at IJE online). The
final number of articles included in the final review was 31
covering 29 distinct patient groups, for which data extrac-
tion was undertaken. Study quality and validity assessment
for all selected studies are shown in Supplementary
Appendix A2.
Characteristics of included studies
Most data (Table 1) came from retrospectively adminis-
tered interviews with survivors or their close contacts or
from clinical notes, using standardized questionnaires, and
usually collected less than 3 months after illness.
Community disease transmission occurred from 1967
to 2015 in 10, primarily African, countries (Angola,
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)/Zaire, Guinea,
Liberia, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Sudan, Uganda, West Germany). Quantitative
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data were available for BUDV, EBOV, MARV and SUDV
species, but accounts for how people contracted disease
were overwhelmingly anecdotal for EBOV. Laboratory
methods [culture or polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests]
confirmed filovirus infection as the cause of disease in
each outbreak; but most studies included some
cases identified from clinical history and antibody presence
only.
Figure 1. Study selection procedure.
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Seven papers gave different forms of numerical odds or
risk ratios for developing disease.22–28 Two further art-
icles11,19 gave data that enabled us to calculate unadjusted
odds ratios for one outbreak. The available odds, risk and
prevalence ratio data are summarized in Table 2. The ana-
lysis of Dowell et al24 is unique because it broke down risk
of transmission by stage of illness at exposure (incubation
period, early or late illness). Other sources do not have
detailed linkage to disease onset, but still can be used to
support observations about overall trends of evidence.
Most of the numbers in Table 2 are crude odds ratios (not
adjusted for confounding variables). Data from two
papers22,24 are mostly adjusted for co-variates, and we
consequently have more confidence in these results than
others in our discussion.
A further 23 articles are included in the review although
they provide only anecdotal or contact-tracing observa-
tions on how disease transmission probably occurred in
confirmed cases.12,17,18,21,29–45 Only one paper covering
the 2013–15 epidemic had a primary aim to quantify as-
pects of human-to-human transmission,33 which publica-
tion calculated R0 numbers rather than identifying risk
ratios for individual risk factors. Details of the information
provided by this anecdotal group of articles are in
Appendix A4 (available as Supplementary data at IJE
online).
Table 1. Included study characteristics, table ordered by filovirus speciesand chronological date of relevant outbreaks
Species Outbreak date, location, authors Type of information relevant to this review
BUDV Aug–Dec 2007, Bundibugyo Uganda38 Delayed recognition; unconfirmed, risks of attending childbirth
Aug–Dec 2007, Bundibugyo Uganda27 Numerical risk ratio data, various attributes, OR
MARV 1967, Germany and Yugoslavia17,21 Documents transmission of disease from sexual contact
Feb–Mar 1975, Johannesburg South Africa85 Likely transmission moment¼handling wet paper tissues from
bereaved incubator
Mar–Jul 2005, Uige, Angola26 OR data
SUDV 31 Jul–6. Nov 1979, Nzara, Yambio, Sudan25 34 patients, concentration in blood, one ORþ anecdotal, during &
after illness
Aug 2000–Jan 2001, Gulu, Uganda22 PPRs, fomites suggested, many factors
Aug 2000–Jan 2001, Gulu, Uganda40 Children under 18 survive better, close contact risk
EBOV 1 Sep–24 Oct 1976, Bumba, Yambuku, Zaire11,19 ORs (also in Breman et al.) Non-intimate contact risk, touching dry
skin, sexual partners, attending childbirth or a funeral, intimate fu-
neral tasks, needle sharing, bedbugs, rats?
1976–77, Sud-Ubangi subregion, Zaire (Tandala)12 1981–85 surveillance report: direct contact implicated, asymptomatic,
antibody prevalence
Jan–Jul 1995, Kikwit DRC24 PPRs, not recognized until May 1995; households of 27 cases inter-
viewed 17 May–3 June about risk factors (no risk after 1 May);
stage of illness relevance
Apr–May 1995, Mosango DRC28 Related to Kikwit outbreak, 23 only in Mosango; forms of dangerous
contact
Jan-Jul 1995, Kikwit DRC23 Matched ORs
1994–96, Gabon29 Occupation and economic activity
2002–03, Rep. of Congo35 Cases linked to direct contact between people following primary con-
tacts with wildlife
2005, Etoumbi DRC41 Gender factors, funerals, cremation controversy
May–Nov 2007, Occidental Kasaı, DRC37 Suggests via sweat, dead animals
2014, Sierra Leone39 Transmission after caring for ill patient, organizing funeral, caring for
infant or attending during childbirth
2014, Sierra Leone patient taken to Germany36 Believed transmission in office or lavatory; high levels of virus de-
tected in sweat
2014, Sierra Leone34 Funerals, health care workerss affected; people who left clinic but had
EVD after all
2014–15, Sierra Leone32,45 Touching bodies at funerals, contact with or caring for patients,
touching cadavers
2014, Conakry, Guinea33 Reproduction numbers, chains of transmission
2014–15 Guinea18 and Liberia30,42–44 Care in community, funerals and cremation. Also, assistance into taxi
2015 Liberia31 Following sexual contact
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Table 2. Numerical odds, risk or prevalence ratios for filovirus disease transmission
Risk factor Details Unadjusted effect size
(95% CI)
Adjusted effect size
(95% CI)
Demographics and personal attributes
Age Being>18 years24 PRR* 6.8 PRR* 3.6 (1.3-10.1)a
Being>30 years old22 PPR 1.38 (0.64-2.97)
Being 30 years old26 OR 1.32 (0.60-2.92)
Being 34 years old29 OR 0.83 (0.35-1.95)
Being 41–60 years old27 OR 2.0 (0.8–4.9) Not reportedb
Being 40 years old26 OR 0.99 (0.37-2.68)
Sex Being female27 OR 0.63 (0.28–1.43) Not reportedb
Being female22 PPR 1.54 (0.7-3.6)
Being female24 PRR* 2.1 PRR* 1.0 (0.5-2.1)a
Being female26 OR 2.46 (1.03 – 5.90)
Occupation Working in forest23 MOR 1.3 (0.4-6.0)
Fishing23 MOR 3.0 (0.04-235)
Fisherman29 OR 3.12 (0.59-16.41)
Health care worker23 MOR 9.0 (1.6-91.2)
Health care worker26 OR 1.52 (0.41-5.64)
Student26 OR 0.81 (0.34-1.94)
Housewife26 OR 1.23 (0.50-3.04)
Housewife29 OR 0.87 (0.24-3.09)
Farmer29 OR 1.27 (0.15 -10.81)
Trader29 OR 0.77 (0.22 -2.75)
Gold-panner29 OR 1.33 (0.56-3.17)
Setting Urban or suburban (versus rural)26 OR 0.82 (0.23-2.89)
Recent travel To areas with known cases27 OR 1.4 (0.5–3.8) Not reportedb
Outside own local area23 MOR 3.0 (0.2-41.4)
Recurring non-intimate contact
Commerce-related Frequenting markets23 MOR 1.1 (0.3-4.5)
Conversation with case During incubation period24 PRR* 1.5 PRR* 0.7 (0.2-3.0)a
During early illness24 PRR* 3.3 PRR* 0.7 (0.3-2.0)a
During late illness24 PRR* 10.6 PRR* 3.9 (1.2-12.2)a
Washing clothes of a case (Point of disease onset unclear)22 PPR 1.68 (0.78-3.60) PPR 1.02 (0.47-2.2)d
Indirect contact with case Household or similar contact without
direct physical touching26
OR 6.88 (1.35-35.1)
Sharing same hut Without sharing bed/sleeping mat22 PPR 2.16 (0.90-5.19) PPR 2.34 (1.13-4.8)d
Entered same room but no physical contact25 OR 0.06 (0.00-1.06)
Slept in same room11 OR 1.65 (0.95-2.85)
Visiting cases In hospital or their own home, before or after
diagnosis27
OR 8.7 (3.0–26.3) Not reportedb
Visit to ill (with fever and bleeding) friend
(in own home)23
MOR 10.6 (3.8-36.3)
Recurring intimate contact
Shared a meal During early illness24 PRR* 2.5 PRR* 1.2 (0.5-2.7)a
During late illness24 PRR* 7.0 PRR* 2.2 (1.2-4.0)a
With index patient22 PPR 1.94 (0.89-4.22) PPR 1.69 (1.0-2.8)d
Sharing a bed or sleeping
mat
During incubation24 PRR* 2.9 PRR* 1.4 (0.8-2.4)a
During early illness24 PRR* 3.8 PRR* 1.3 (0.7-2.5)a
During late illness24 PRR* 7.4 PRR* 2.2 (1.2-4.2)a
Point of disease onset unclear22 PPR 2.78 (1.15-6.70) PPR 2.93 (1.2-7.4)d
Direct physical contact –
touching
During incubation period24 PRR* 2.9 PRR* 0.8 (0.4-1.8)a
During early illness24 PRR* 12.5
During late illness24 PRR* 12.5
continued
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Table 2. Continued
Risk factor Details Unadjusted effect size
(95% CI)
Adjusted effect size
(95% CI)
With person who had fever or bleeding, at work or
in the market23
MOR 24.0 (3.2-1065)
Contact with body or body fluids of a suspected
case26
OR 11.0 (2.6-46.1)
Touched case11 OR 1.45 (0.73-2.87)
Touching during illness22 PPR 3.53 (0.52-24.11) PPR 1.56 (0.2-13.0)c
Touching but no nursing care25 OR 0.40 (0.11-1.45)
Contact with body fluids Contact with body fluids22 PPR 5.30 (2.14-13.14) PPR 4.61 (1.7-12.3)c
Direct contact with individuals potentially infected
with MHF or their bodily fluids or direct contact
during funeral26
OR 12.0 (3.6-39.6)
Body fluid contact in early illness24 PRR* 6.1
Body fluid contact in late illness24 PRR* 5.9
Likely sexual contact Being spouse of index case24 PRR* 3.8 PRR* 1.3 (0.7-2.5)a
Caring for patient Nursing a patient25 OR 8.9 (3.1-25.4)
Cared for case11 OR 0.99 (0.56-1.76)
Early care at home, not until death22 PPR 6 (1.3-27.1) P for trend for these
3 < 0.001At hospital until death22 PPR 8.57 (1.9-37.7)
In home until death22 PPR 13.33 (3.2-55.6)
Aided patient in childbirth11 OR 2.46 (1.02-5.92)
Funeral-related activities
Viewed body Without touching24 PRR* 4.8 PRR* 1.6 (0.5-4.9)a
Attended Special (pre-funeral) rituals23 MOR 0.8 (0.2-3.2)
Funeral itself23 MOR 3.0 (1.2-7.6)
Funeral itself11 OR 0.86 (0.41-1.79)
Communal meal As part of funeral event22 PPR 2.84 (1.35-5.98) PPR 1.5 (0.98-2.28)d
Touched body Before or during funeral22 PPR 1.95 (0.91-4.17) PPR 1.84 (0.95-3.55)c
Before or during ceremony24 PRR* 4.9 PRR* 2.1 (1.1-4.2)a
Ritual handwashing22 PPR 2.25 (1.08-4.72) PPR 1.16 (0.54-2.49)d
Washing and dressing body27 OR 7.4 (2.9–19.3) OR 3.83 (1.78-8.23)b
Direct contact with corpse, its body fluids or soiled
items26
OR 38.5 (4.2-352.1)
Prepared for burial23 MOR 13.1 (1.4-631)
Prepared cadaver OR 1.07 (0.63-1.82)
Previous use of health services (nocosomial indicators)
Taking regular medication Kikwit outbreak 199523 MOR 2.0 (0.5-9.8)
Admitted previously to hos-
pital for something else
Before outbreak was recognized, Kikwit outbreak,
199523
MOR 9.9 (3.1-41.0)
Received injection Before outbreak was recognized, Kikwit, 199523 MOR 30.0 (4.3-1302)
Admission or visit to
hospital
For any reason27 OR 8.7 (3.0-26.3) Not reportedb
Number of types of direct
contact (touching ill pa-
tient, touching dead
body, touching body
fluid)
No direct contact22 PPR 1.0 P for trend for these
4 < 0.001One type of contact22 PPR 0.18 (0.01-2.45)
Two types of contact22 PPR 1.94 (0.30-12.44)
Three types of contact22 PPR 4.00 (0.64-25.02)
PRR*, prevalence rate ratio; PPR, prevalence proportion ratio; MOR, matched odds ratio; OR, odds ratio. Bold text indicates a 95% confidence interval that
is entirely above 1.0. Otherwise, where figures are missing, figures were not provided or not possible to calculate.
aAdjusted for direct physical contact during illness and contacts with body fluids.
bDropped from multivariate logistic regression by authors due to lack of significance at P< 0.05.
cUsing multivariate log-binomial regression models, factors included touching patient during illness, touching dead body and contact with patient fluids.
dUsing multivariate log-binomial regression models, factors included shared meals, washed clothes, slept in same hut or mat, ritual handwashing during funeral
and communal meal during funeral, and also controlled for intensity of contacts (two or more indirect contacts versus less).
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Demographic variables
Outbreak reports often state40,46,47 that, compared with
other age groups, children were less frequently infected
and more frequently survived; but this is not consistently
confirmed by statistical analysis on EBOV.24,48 There is
mixed evidence (minimum OR 0.83, 95% CI 0.35–1.95, to
maximum prevalence rate ratio 6.8, no 95% CI
stated),22,24,27 as to whether increased age among adults is
a risk factor for contracting filovirus illness. Gender-
related risk ratios ranged from OR 0.63 (95% CI 0.28–
1.43) to OR 2.46 (95% CI 1.03–5.90).22,26,27,47 Recent
travel yielded OR 1.4 (95% CI 0.5–3.8) or matched odds
ratio 3.0 (95% CI 0.2–41.4).23,27 Although high preva-
lence of Marburg virus antibodies has been reported
among forest workers49 and miners,29,50 these occupations
(or being a housewife) were not associated with raised risk
of contracting disease (ORs range from 0.87, 95% CI
0.24–3.09, to 3.12, 95% CI 0.59–16.41).29
Intensity of contact
Within Table 2, contact was put in order of (approxi-
mately) increasing intimacy: non-intimate or intimate with
live cases, or with cadavers. It is notable that even within
the same categories, there was often substantial heterogen-
eity in reported risk ratios, making it difficult to provide
single estimates of risk. This difficulty is compounded by
the fact that many studies did not adequately control for
confounding. In the discussion below, stated risk ratios are
unadjusted for any confounding factors except where
noted.
Only one article24 provided data for prevalence of risk
ratios according to stage of infection (incubation, early or
late illness; late illness was defined as post-hospitalization).
The adjusted relative risks associated with sharing a bed
with a case during the incubation period was PRR 1.4
(95% CI 0.8–2.4) and during early illness PRR 1.3 (95%
CI 0.7–2.5), but bed-sharing in later illness yielded a much
higher risk ratio (PRR 2.2, 95% CI 1.2–4.2).24 Such
chronological data were missing from other reports, which
only gave combined risks from contact at all stages of incu-
bation or illness.
Faye et al.33 observed that 72% of transmission was be-
tween family members. These and other data strongly sug-
gest that non-intimate contact such as frequenting markets
(MOR 1.1, 95% CI 0.3–4.5),23 conversation with a case in
early illness [adjusted (adj.) PRR 0.7, 0.3–2.0]24 or sharing
a home but not sleeping space11 had low risk of transmis-
sion before and during early illness. Even touching dry skin
(adj. PRR, 0.8 95% CI 0.4–1.8), sharing meals (adj. PRR
1.2, 0.5–2.7) or a bed (adj. PRR 1.3, 0.7–2.5) during early
disease stages lacked a significant risk of contracting acute
infection.24 Washing clothes of a case yielded adj. PPR
1.02 (95% CI 0.47–2.2).22 Disease transmission to people
who had regular but non-intimate contact with cases
(household or workplace) had quite variable association
with disease transmission (OR range from 0.06, 95% CI 0-
1.06,25 to OR 6.88, 95% CI 1.35–35.126).
Disease contraction from casual contact with sweat has
been suggested,37 although most studies fail to detect virus
in sweat.36,51–55 Shared office or lavatory facilities was
implicated by Kreuels et al36 but was not the only possible
opportunity for the relevant case. Sexual partners of con-
valescents are potentially at chronic but low risk of getting
disease,11,56 due to persistence of detectable virus for many
weeks in semen and vaginal excretions57 of convalescents.
Filovirus transmission from sexual contact with a convales-
cent has been documented only twice since 1967.17,31
Being a spouse of a victim24 was not shown to be risky as
it had a 95% CI for prevalence rate ratio between 0.7 and
2.5 when adjusted for other factors.
During later stages of illness (when bodily fluids with
high viral loads are mostly likely to be shed), even rela-
tively non-intimate contact posed some remaining risks
even after adjustment for direct contact (e.g. conversa-
tion, PRR 3.9, 95% CI 1.2–12.2).24 During all active dis-
ease stages, sharing a meal had PPR 1.69 (95% CI 1.0–
2.8) and sharing a bed had PPR 2.93 (95% CI 1.2–7.4).22
During late disease, sharing a meal had adjusted PPR 2.2
(95% CI 1.2–4.0) and sharing a bed had adjusted PRR
2.2 (95% CI 1.2–4.2).24 Touching feverish people had
MOR 24 (95% CI 3.2–1065)23 and touching bodily fluids
had OR 11 (95% CI 2.6–46.1).26 That disease often fol-
lows directly touching body fluids is corroborated by
much anecdotal evidence.18,21–23,26,28,44) Visiting known
patients in their homes raised risk of acquiring disease
(MOR 10.6, 95% CI 3.8–36.3).23 Attending the birth of
a child to an ill patient conferred OR 2.46 (95% CI 1.02–
5.92)11,19 for contracting disease, and transmission from
attendant to mother-in-labour has also been implicated.39
Other forms of direct physical contact with ill patients
were identified as being associated with a high risk of
transmission.12,35,38,39 However, the greatest risks are
associated with caring for an actively ill patient (min-
imum OR 0.99, 95% CI 0.56–1.76, and maximum OR
8.9, 95% CI 3.1–25.4)22,25 or visiting patients receiving
care (OR 8.7, 95% CI 3.0–26.3 and MOR 10.6, 95% CI
3.8–36.3).23,27 Caring for patients at home until death
carries very high risk of disease transmission (OR 13.33,
95% CI 3.2–55.6).22,30
The quantitative and adjusted data presented in Table 2
suggest that in themselves neither viewing a body(adj.
PRR 1.6, 95% CI 0.5–4.9)24 nor attending a funeral
(MOR ranges from 0.8, 95% CI 0.2–3.2, to 3.0, 95% CI
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1.2–7.6)11,19,23,33 pose elevated risks, but rather that it is
the nature of traditional funeral-associated activities that
increases risk. One anecdotal report18 found that among
cases that arose after a specific (traditional) funeral cere-
mony, 21% of cases had directly touched the cadaver and
the other 79% of linked cases had physical contact with
those who touched the body either during the service or
afterwards. However, briefly touching the cadaver is not
consistently associated with increased risk (range of adj.
PPR 1.16, 95% CI 0.54-2.49, to adj. PRR 2.1, 95% CI
1.1–4.2).22,24 Sharing a communal meal during the funeral
was found to pose an elevated risk (adj. PPR 1.5, 95%
CI¼ 0.98–2.28),22 perhaps due to crowded conditions.
The intimate tasks (washing and dressing) associated with
preparing a body for funeral and burial tend to confer a
very high risk of disease transmission, although again data
Figure 2. Attack rates without direct contact between household members.
Figure 3. Attack rates after direct contact between household members.
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are inconsistent (range from OR 1.07, 95% CI 0.63–1.82,
to MOR 13.1, 95% CI 1.4–631).11,19,23,26,27,30,41
Contact with health services and other possible
risks
Elevated transmission risk following contact with health
services appears in Table 2 and is also recounted in
Supplementary Appendix A4, particularly for the 1995
Kikwit outbreak in the DRC.23 Transmission rates associ-
ated with health service contact were high in these out-
breaks, partly because the disease was recognized belatedly
with subsequent delayed implementation of control meas-
ures.33,58 Unsafe needle-sharing practices as part of a vac-
cination programme were also specifically blamed for
rapid disease spread during the 1976 emergence of
EBOV.11,19 Visiting a hospital or caring for filovirus cases
in hospital raised transmission risks dramatically in most
outbreaks (OR 8.7, 95% CI 3–26.3, and MOR 9.9, 95%
CI 3.1–41.0).22–25,27
Meta-analysis
Three papers gave sufficient data to calculate incidence
rates in household contacts with and without a history of
direct contact.22,24,25 The proportion meta-analyses
(Figures 2 and 3) drew on a total of 254 direct contacts
and 135 indirect contacts. Among those household con-
tacts reporting direct contact with a case, the attack rate
was 32% (95% CI 26–38%) without important heterogen-
eity. In household contacts with no history of direct con-
tact, the attack rate was 1% (95% CI 0–5%). Only one
confirmed case with no direct contact in any of the three
studies was reported.22 This person ‘slept wrapped up in a
blanket left by his brother’, recently deceased from EVD. It
was possible that this was a case of transmission from dir-
ect contact with body fluids. Breman et al.19 also reported
data sufficient to calculate attack rates in household con-
tacts, but without distinction between direct and indirect
contact. Instead, they reported that the attack rate was
27% between spouses, brothers and sisters or between par-
ents and children. In all other relatives the attack rate was
only 8.0%.
Discussion
We present the first systematic review that addresses the
behavioural and other risk factors associated with filovirus
(Ebola and Marburg disease) infection within the commu-
nity. The key findings of this review are that infection risk
is primarily associated with three behaviours: (i) close con-
tact in the later stages of infection; (ii) caring for a sick
person; or (iii) when preparing the recently deceased for
burial. These findings are not surprising, and our review
has strengthened the evidence base for them. Importantly,
we provide a more nuanced understanding of the risks, es-
pecially around risks associated with indirect contact. For
example, we have found no evidence of risk associated
with casual contact with asymptomatic individuals outside
the home. Even between household contacts who did not
have direct physical contact, the risk of disease transmis-
sion is relatively minor (1%, CI¼ 0-5%), although not
zero. We have also confirmed that there is negligible if any
risk of contracting disease during the incubation period
and only low risk in the first week of symptomatic illness.
Our review also confirms the high risk of transmission
associated with funerals, and that disease transmission
appears to most often follow after touching the body of a
case.
Visiting or caring for filovirus cases in hospital raised
transmission risks dramatically across most outbreaks.22–
25,27 This is probably due to high viral loads associated
with severe disease and insufficient protection measures. It
has been suggested33 that earlier hospitalization and longer
hospital stays (provided sufficient isolation and protection
procedures are followed) could significantly shorten the
duration of filovirus outbreaks.
Although this review concerned person-to-person trans-
mission in the community, it was not always possible to
distinguish primary from secondary cases. We excluded
reports where disease clearly resulted from wildlife con-
tacts, but some risk ratios were undoubtedly calculated for
mixed groups of primary cases (disease acquired from
wildlife or wildlife environments) and secondary cases
(from humans). The ecological niche that each filovirus
occupies would certainly impact on some risk factors for
primary infection59 (such as occupation). However, the
ratio of secondary to primary cases in most outbreaks is so
large9 that ecological factors responsible for primary dis-
ease acquisition are unlikely to have a major influence on
calculated risk ratios.
Why adulthood would increase the risk of illness is un-
certain, although the risk of illness does not appear to
depend on lower total viral load, and contradicts intuition
that small children would tend to have greater risks due to
more physical contact with their carers.60 The association
with adulthood may be primarily explained by the fact
that adults tend to be the carers.25 Funeral-related events
are another well-recognized opportunity for infection
transmission.18,32–34,39,41,61 Viable virus has been isolated
from animal tissues or fluids in the laboratory as late as 7
days post-mortem.62 However, not all of the studies found
such an association between attending funerals and disease
risk. Furthermore, even for those attending funerals where
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transmission occurs, only people who engage in certain
behaviours are particularly at risk. It is possible for digni-
fied funerals to be held without high risk to those attend-
ing.63 Unfortunately, efforts to persuade local populations
to change funeral traditions during outbreaks, and in
particular to allow cremation, often meet cultural
resistance.35,41,44,64
Of particular relevance to policy is the strong evidence
that risk to family members is high in those caring for their
relatives up to death, and that this risk is much higher in
those caring for people within the home (unadj. PPR
13.33, 95% CI 3.2–55.6).22 Such an observation strength-
ens the need to ensure that sufficient spaces are available in
health care facilities so that no one suspected of filovirus
infection has to be cared for in their own home until death.
Our review focused on community human-to-human
infection, and excluded transmissions to health care work-
ers within clinical environments actively treating filo-
virus,25,28,34,65,66 accidents in research laboratories67 or
wildlife contact. We omitted cases in health care or labora-
tory workers because they tend to lead to few subsequent
cases33 (with notable exceptions particularly when EVD
has not yet been identified68–70). The risk of transmission
in laboratory or clinical environments can clearly be
greatly minimized with stringent control measures33,66,71
that are unlikely to be replicable in the community.
Wildlife contacts are extremely important in filovirus epi-
demiology because outbreak starts are nearly always
linked to contact with animals, but calculating the risks of
contracting disease is very difficult due to lack of data on
wildlife contacts in Africa that do not result in filovirus dis-
ease. Wildlife contacts may be at least partly responsible
for widespread filovirus antibody seroprevalence after
asymptomatic illness.11–14,49,50,72–74 Genetic analysis
strongly suggests that the 2013–15 outbreak was driven by
human-to-human transmission rather than new imports
after the initial emergence.75
Limitations
We were able to produce only limited pooled estimates of
risk of transmission because the included papers were in-
consistent in defining risk factors or which measures of
association were used; plus, many of the earlier studies pre-
sented only unadjusted estimates. The partial exceptions to
this are the data on disease transmission risk to household
contacts with, and without, direct contact. Consequently
we are unable to specify with sufficient degree of certainty
how risky specific behaviours may be. Nevertheless, the
general findings of low risk for contracting disease from
relatively casual contact is reassuring. It is also important
to emphasise that low risk of contracting disease (e.g. from
casual contact), which we discuss at length in this paper, is
not the same as saying that such contact poses low risk
overall to human health after disease has developed. The
total risk to human health results from risk of transmission
combined with likely consequences of disease, and filovirus
diseases are usually very dangerous.
We excluded articles which identified cases solely from
symptomology or antibody counts13,15,49,50,60,73,74,76–78
The symptoms of Ebola and Marburg virus can mimic
other diseases endemic to sub-Saharan Africa,9 and filo-
virus antibodies from asymptomatic infection are in
2–15% of the regional population not otherwise known to
have ever had relevant illness.9,11–14,49,72,73 Concerns have
been raised about problems of high rates of false-positives
from Ebola virus antibody tests,79,80 which is why, ideally,
we wanted to only report results from patients who had at
least one positive laboratory test for filovirus infection. In
reality, too few articles met that strict criterion. Some
reports also did not clearly state whether interviews, con-
tact tracing and risk ratios were calculated only with
laboratory-confirmed cases. Therefore, our rule was to
include risk ratio and anecdotal data in articles where at
least some of the patients among the identified cases in the
disease cohort were laboratory confirmed, with others
identified by clinical and contact history. We are also not
in a position to comment on the impacts of possible virus
mutations on transmission risks; there is mixed evi-
dence13,81,82 about whether the large 2013–15 epidemic
may have caused the virus to become more or less infec-
tious or deadly to humans. Although it is common prac-
tice in epidemiological reviews, grouping Marburg and
Ebola viruses together may not be ideal. Better risk assess-
ments may result as more detailed information emerges
about the transmission risk factors for each individual
filovirus. Nevertheless, there was no evidence within the
studies we found that suggested that the risk factors for
human-to-human transmission differ between the two
genera.
It is also unfortunate that we do not have specific odds
or risk ratio data for the 2013–15 outbreak. Most of the
information emerging from this epidemic is still anecdotal.
Undoubtedly, useful risk prevalence or odds ratio figures
will emerge from the large Western Africa outbreak.
However, this may not be until after vaccination pro-
grammes have commenced these inoculation programmes
need information as soon as possible about the best strat-
egy for containing the current and likely future outbreaks.
Implications
The 2013–15 epidemic was unprecedented due to the large
number of cases in densely populated urban settings.
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Only one of our selected papers33 discussed factors which
may be especially relevant in this but not previous out-
breaks, including (but not limited to): population density
in home area, level of education, income or affluence lev-
els, urban occupation group, type of home or household
construction materials, religious practices, funeral prac-
tices and proximity to medical care. Better future disease
containment in urban areas may depend on identification
of risk factors specific to urban Africa. Reducing possible
risks may also mean long-term cultural changes (e.g. trad-
itional funeral practices) that are difficult for local popula-
tions to accept.
The implications of our review are that when vaccin-
ation is not widely available, the primary control measure
for filovirus infections should remain the early identifica-
tion of cases, contact tracing and subsequent quarantine
and care of cases in suitably equipped treatment centres.
When vaccination is possible, then priority should be given
to individuals engaged in activities that involve high-risk
direct contact with confirmed or suspected cases (or bodily
waste): e.g. those providing physical care within the com-
munity and treatment centres. A second-level priority ring
for vaccination would for those who have other forms of
direct contact with known or suspected cases. Such a ring
approach to disease containment is already in use, in the
2013–15 EBOV outbreak.83
Conclusions
We have shown that risk of acquisition of filovirus infec-
tions primarily follows from only close personal contact
and generally only in later stages of illness. By making this
statement, in no way do we deny that filovirus infections
are dangerous. The EVD transmission paradox (colloqui-
ally summarized as ‘Hard to catch, Easy to die from’) has
been discussed previously84 but never summarized with as
much quantitative and documentary evidence as we pro-
vide. Caring for patients until death is particularly risky,
especially within domestic settings. Among people experi-
encing only indirect contact, even when living in the same
house, the risk of contracting disease is actually quite low.
There is little evidence that more distant contact or that
contact with people incubating the disease poses any risks.
More studies are needed that correlate context, timing and
intimacy of contact with days after disease onset and exter-
nal symptoms or severity of illness. There is evidence that
transmission from non-intimate contact is low during early
illness, but there is no simple indicator for the transition to
late illness when disease transmission is highly likely from
any contact without adequate protective measures. Meta-
analysis showed that transmission is very unlikely without
direct physical contact. Once an outbreak has been identi-
fied, care for patients in well-equipped health care facilities
cuts transmission rates. There is wide variation in the con-
fidence intervals and magnitude, in many suggested risk
factors even when adjusted for confounders, suggesting
that understanding of community filovirus transmission
could be greatly improved.
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